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Signs of  Signs
‘Quotation’ is one of  several terms (such as ‘sentence’, ‘period’, and ‘syntax’) that have
been applied to music by analogy with their earlier linguistic usage.1 The depth of  this
particular analogy has remained underexplored. Particularly striking is the near-absence
in studies of  musical quotation of  any reference to the extensive literature on quotation
produced by philosophers of  language.2 That is understandable, in view of  the fact that
most of  the fine-grained semantic problems they discuss are irrelevant to music. It is
still an open question however whether certain basic distinctions may not apply to both,
and contribute to the somewhat elusive but substantial analogy between music and lan-
guage.
Among its many aspects (grammatical, rhetorical, literary, ethical), what has most
fascinated philosophers of  language about quotation is the peculiar relation between
the sign and its referent, the quoted item and its source. The problem has its classical
formulation in Gottlob Frege’s On Sense and Reference (1892):
If  words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of  is their reference. It
can also happen, however, that one wishes to talk about the words themselves or their
sense. This happens, for instance, when the words of  another are quoted. One’s own
words then must designate words of  the other speaker, and only the latter have their
usual reference. We then have signs of  signs. In writing, the words are in this case en-
closed in quotation marks. Accordingly, a word standing between quotation marks must
not be taken as having its ordinary reference. (Frege 1960: 58-59)
Here Frege in fact discusses two different kinds of  quotation. It is one thing to speak
about ‘the words themselves’; another to ‘designate words of  the other speaker’. That
occurs in direct speech, as in (1); the first kind is known as ‘pure quotation’, as in (2).
(1) Peter said: ‘Bankers are crooks’.
(2) ‘Bankers are crooks’ is a sentence.
What holds for both is that they are signs of  signs. This distinction between regular
signs and quotational metasigns coincides with that between ‘use’ and ‘mention’, that
has become standard in the literature. We ‘use’ words as signs to say something; when
we  quote,  we  refer  to  those  words  (‘mention’  them)  by  transforming  them  into
1 ‘Quotation’ has entered musical lexicography with Elmar Budde, ‘Zitat’, in Carl Dahlhaus and Hans Heinrich 
Eggebrecht (eds), Brockhaus Riemann Musiklexikon (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1978); belatedly followed by the 
second editions of  Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart (1994) and The New Grove Dictionary of  Music and Musicians 
(2001). For a history of  the concept of  musical quotation, see these and Armbruster (2001).
2 Surveys: Cappelen and Lepore (2007); Cappelen, Herman, Ernie Lepore, and Matthew McKeever, ‘Quotation’, in
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, Spring 2019 Edition. 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/quotation/>. accessed 18 October 2019.
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metasigns. Inherent in this process is the indiscriminability of  sign and metasign; indis-
criminability, that is, in the absence of  quotation marks or other clues. The proper use
of  quotation marks has therefore been an important theme in the philosophy of  quota-
tion, as it has branched out of  mathematical logic. With a broadening of  the discussion
to include the practices of  ordinary language, their status and significance has become
one of  the contentious issues.
Despite visual (and auditory) appearances, there clearly is an important difference
between what is quoted in (1) and (2): what is signified is not the same. In (2) it is a
grammatical string of  words, in (1) what matters is what Peter said, the sense of  his
words, expressing a judgment about bankers. In this sense, the words are also used. We
may draw further inferences from it, or add a judgment of  our own, etc. (3).
(3) That ‘bankers are crooks’, as Peter said, is nonsense.
From this we may conclude that the use-mention distinction is significant, but at the
same time fluid: quite often an expression does double duty, both as a sign and as its
own metasign. 
Sometimes the words of  a speaker are quoted without understanding, disabled as
signs. In (4) the words are merely speech sounds, reproduced phonetically. As such they
do not belong to the language spoken. In writing too, with or without understanding,
we may quote from other sign systems, as in (5).
(4) Heinrich said ‘Wee gaits’, whatever that means.
(5) The stress pattern can be represented as ‘¶¶¶»|¶± ’.
It is a linguistically remarkable feature of  quotation that strings of  words may acquire a
different function in sentence syntax (2), and, more contentiously, that even non-lin-
guistic  objects  may occupy a slot  in  the sentence (5).3 By fulfilling the function of
words, they may become part of  the lexicon. That is unlikely to happen with something
like (5), but onomatopoeia is a familiar case of  sound imitations that have been lexical -
ized (6). As long as they are unfamiliar, they may be highlighted as alien elements; with
habituation they may become regular verbs and nouns.
(6a) The oboe did: ‘squeak!’.
(6b) The oboe ‘squeak’-ed.
(6c) The oboe squeaked.
A similar observation may be made relating to scare quotes.4 By fulfilling the function
of  a so-called or what you might call they often point towards a particular kind of  discourse,
or signal a novel sense given to the word. When introducing a word in an unfamiliar or
technical sense, such as ‘use’ and ‘mention’ in the title of  this essay, it is customary to
use quotation marks, but it would be pedantic to keep doing so. In philosophical dis-
course they have become part of  the lexicon. Rather than merely being a stylistically
somewhat  condemnable  practice,  scare  quoting  is  something we continually  do:  we
adapt the lexicon to our needs, changing the sense of  words and phrases, borrowing
from different kinds of  discourse, and introducing novel expressions. The extraordi-
3 Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 23) consider similar examples ‘fairly uncontroversial’.
4 For a recent discussion and references, see Mark McCullagh, ‘Scare-Quoting and Incorporation’, in Saka and 
Johnson (2018: 3-34). Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 56) call scare quotes a ‘speech-act heuristic’ that is ‘no more a 
linguistic constituent of  the sentence than a gesture or a winking eye’.
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nary lexical object highlighted in (6a, b) may soon become the regular verb of  (6c). The
quality of  being mentioned may therefore be only weakly present, as a mere signalling
of  a somewhat uncommon use. 
I consider this to be one of  the two most relevant insights gained from an often
heated (and sometimes scholastic) debate that has been going on for a few decades: that
the distinction between use and mention, by being both non-exclusive and gradual, can
accommodate a broad variety of  quotational phenomena. That this leads us into con-
fusing,  grey areas does not invalidate the distinction,  as grey does not diminish the
status of  black and white. It is precisely this fluidity which allows quotation to make a
significant contribution to the flexibility of  language. That is the second insight: that
without  quotation  language  wouldn’t  be  the  extraordinarily  versatile  communicative
device it is.5
That may be uncontroversial, but beyond that there is no consensus. Current theor-
ies of  quotation show a divergence between two fundamentally different perspectives,
which can be characterized as semanticist and pragmaticist.6 It corresponds to the two
basic,  intimately  interrelated  aspects  of  quotation:  the  relation  between  signs  and
metasigns, and use versus mention. While the distinction between sign and metasign is
inherently semantic, the use-mention distinction implies a pragmatic dimension. It is
speakers who use or mention, who choose whether ‘to talk about the words themselves
or their sense’; and it is up to their interpreters to guess their intentions, on the basis of
what’s most relevant in the present context.
Semanticists have continued the logicist tradition of  Frege, Tarski, and Quine, and
have limited their attention to quotation as it is formalized by the use of  quotation
marks in writing. In this example from Quine, (7a) and (7b) signify different statements.
As Quine points out, the second is true, the first is ‘not merely untrue but ungrammat-
ical and meaningless’.7
(7a) Dreary rhymes with weary.
(7b) ‘Dreary’ rhymes with ‘weary’.
That is true in a world where orthography is part of  syntax, 8 but many readers will be
inclined to interpret both as equivalent, with (7a) merely disregarding conventions of
writing. Generally, understanding language involves the active and generous coopera-
tion of  readers and listeners.
It is the function of  quotation marks to show that a sign is transformed into its
metasign. A rigorous semanticist approach may deny that a theory of  quotation should
say anything more than precisely that. This is the gist of  Cappelen and Lepore’s Dis-
quotational Theory: it explains quotation as governed by the axiom schema ‘‘e’’ quotes ‘e’
5 Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 8, 123).
6 My choice of  terms. Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 37) call pragmaticist theories (somewhat confusingly) ‘use 
theories’.
7 Quoted after Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 36).
8 Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 13) in fact call quotation marks ‘syntactic devices’. Often they are considered 
punctuation, but this is an altogether useless category, in which syntactic (. ,), prosodic (!?) and other functions (/ 
[...]) are thrown together. More appropriately they are considered ancillary signs (Hilfszeichen) with a special 
‘semantopragmatic’ function. See Elke Brendel, Jörg Meibauer and Markus Steinbach, ‘Aspekte einer Theorie des 
Zitierens’, in id. (2007: 5-25, at 9).
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(where ‘e’ is replaceable by any quotable item).9 The theory does not purport to answer
the question what it is that we do when we quote. For Cappelen and Lepore, the meaning of
‘‘e’’ simply  depends on whatever  is  the meaning of  ‘e’;  that  this  may have multiple
senses is not to be accounted for by a theory of  quotation.
Theories of  the semanticist  type tend to present  the data as if  language where
something autonomous, something that can ‘do things’, rather than as something hu-
mans use to do things with.  Characteristic is Donald Davidson’s characterization of
quotation as a ‘reflexive twist’, in which language itself  is the agent:
In quotation not only does language turn on itself, but it does so word by word and ex-
pression by expression … (Davidson 2001: 79)
This is a point of  view alien to pragmaticists, who have drawn much of  their inspira-
tion from speech act  theorists  such as  J.L.  Austin,  J.  Searle,  and (particularly)  H.P.
Grice.10 It is speakers who cause language to turn on itself, and they do that in order to
enhance its flexibility. Quotation marks are no more than a fairly recent, eighteenth-
century graphic convention.11 To make these graphic signs a defining and constitutive
element in quotation has no better justification than giving letters a role in the defini-
tion of  the word ‘word’. 
In practice, quotation marks are often erratically applied, and the use-mention dis-
tinction can not be made to depend on them; it has to be inferred from grammatical
and contextual clues. Quotation may be unmarked in writing by convention, as when
Peter introduces himself  by mentioning his name (Hello, I’m Peter). Often (as in (2)) the
quotation is articulated grammatically. On the other hand, the uniformity of  the graph-
ic sign obscures the diversity of  its application, and suggests a discreteness of  the dis-
tinction (quoted or not quoted) which in ordinary language does not exist. Since there
are no ‘weak’ quotation marks, any expression quoted in some weaker sense may be
either overemphasized by being marked, or left unmarked and therefore be unrecog-
nized.
The most debated pragmatic theory of  quotation is the Demonstration Theory,
first  formulated  by  psychologists  Clark  and  Gerrig,  and  more  recently  revised  by
François Récanati.12 The act of  mentioning is interpreted as a demonstration, which
holds an iconic or depictive relation towards the referent. According to Récanati, 
In quotation, what we demonstrate is a piece of  verbal behaviour – a way of  speaking.
We demonstrate it by producing an instance of  that behaviour, that is, by speaking in
the relevant way. (Récanati 2001: 640)
Accordingly, quoting somebody is on a par with other demonstrations of  behaviour,
such as showing how to perform a tennis serve, imitating a friend’s limp, or moving like
a pendulum.13
9 Formerly ‘Minimal Theory’; Cappelen and Lepore (2007: 26).
10 Daniel Gutzmann and Erik Stei, ‘Quotation Marks and Kinds of  Meaning: Arguments in Favor of  a Pragmatic 
Account’, in Brendel, Meibauer and Steinbach ( 2011: 161-194).
11 Michael Johnson, ‘Quotation through History: A Historical Case for the Proper Treatment of  Quotation’, in  
Saka and Johnson (2018: 281-302).
12 Clark and Gerrig (1990: 764–805); Récanati (2001). In Davidson’s (semanticist) Demonstrative Theory, quotation 
marks have a demonstrative function.
13 Examples taken from Clark and Gerrig (1990: 764).
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While cases of  mention may often be demonstrations, and the object of  a demon-
stration (such as a tennis serve) may often be indiscriminable from the demonstration,
it seems doubtful to me that what we quote is an instance of  behaviour. Quoting Peter
(1), we do not imitate his behaviour. What we replicate are his words (the ‘sign’), not his
speech act (unless the quotation is part of  an imitative act, such as parody). It is at this
more abstract linguistic level that he is quoted. A limp and a tennis serve on the other
hand can be demonstrated, but not ‘used’, because they are not signs and elements in
discourse. We do not ‘quote’ a limp by demonstrating it, and our demonstration is not a
metasign.
What all of  these theories, semanticist or pragmaticist, have in common is that they
attempt to explain quotation as an instance of  some more general phenomenon  x.
Since Davidson’s influential 1979 essay Quotation14 they been labelled on the pattern of
‘The X-Theory of  Quotation’ (X standing for labels such as Proper Name, Picture, De-
scription,  Demonstration,  Disquotation,  and Identity).  Their  weaknesses  are  a  con-
sequence of  the narrowness of  such definition: any x theory will fail as soon as some
type of  quotation cannot be properly analysed as an instance of  x. 
It is evident that only a pragmatic approach will allow us to consider quotation out-
side language. We cannot appeal to quotation marks as fulfilling a constitutive function,
though, as we will see, marking devices do play a role in musical quotation. What we
need in order to transpose the linguistic concept of  quotation to music is not an ex-
planation of  quotation as a phenomenon x, but a set of  conditions that allow us to dis-
cuss musical and linguistic phenomena non-metaphorically in the same terms. 
Replication, Reference, and Embedding
It may seem that the attempt to chart the domain of  musical quotation by the guidance
of  language, rather than in its own terms, is doomed from the outset. Music lacks se-
mantics in the linguistic sense (whatever meaning it may have in a broader sense), and it
can produce nothing like direct or indirect speech, nor pure quotation. We can’t mention
something without the referential function uniquely exercised by words.
This objection can be brushed aside. While it is evidently true that music can’t show
up analogues of  (1) and (2), it has been shown that the domain of  quotation is broader,
and that its manifestations are not always so clear-cut. What musical quotation may re-
semble more closely is the use of  block quotes in a text such as this (without the foot-
notes), or the use of  familiar sayings and expressions in conversation.15 As for the last
part of  the objection, examples (4) and (5) show that mention does not require that the
quoted item itself  contributes to lexical semantics. Nor do we need this in order to
transform a sign into a metasign; what we need is a context (in whatever medium) that
is sufficiently coherent and significant to encapsulate a sign, and make it stand out qua
sign. Coherence and significance are discursive qualities that language evidently has, and
that music may have, in some of  its manifestations.
This notion of  discursivity may not be uncontroversial, nor sufficiently clear; but it
14 Reprinted in Davidson (2001).
15 ‘... the phenomenology of  musical quotation is similar to that of  nonreferenced quotation in language.’ Bicknell 
(2001: 189).
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is supported by the long tradition in eighteenth and nineteenth century aesthetics which
characterizes music as ‘speech’ or ‘a speech’, articulating a flow of  expressive elements,
‘thoughts’ or ‘ideas’. A full justification of  this notion of  music as discourse would re-
quire an essay of  its  own;  here I can only give the briefest  hint of  a plea for this
premise. 
A first condition, which music evidently satisfies, is that it is usually perceived as
human-communicative. So are traffic signs; with the substantial difference, that these
are isolated signs that fail to enter into any significant relationship, while music consti-
tutes its meaning by unfolding through time in a coherent way, leading and often frus-
trating our expectations. It may thereby resemble an address to the listener, or a mono-
logue (also dialogue) intended to be overheard. This does not imply that the listener
perceives this discourse as somebody’s (the composer’s, for instance). We are quite used to
interpreting  human  communication  as  not  attributable  to  any  specific  author;  law
books, weather forecasts, and traffic signs belong to human communication, but are en-
tirely impersonal. We often unthinkingly accept that a text itself  ‘says’ whatever it says.
So does music.
But not all the world’s music is discursive; maybe most is not. Dance music should
above all make us dance, not listen to how it ‘speaks’. For music, the ‘reflexive twist’ is
inessential. It is an add-on, that may have been borrowed from language in a specific
cultural setting. The European (particularly post-renaissance) tradition strongly emphas-
ized the ties between music and grammar, rhetoric and poetry. Even within this tradi-
tion, obviously, not all music is equally discursive. A minuet is less likely to have pro-
nounced discursive properties than the first movement of  a sonata.
Given this  discursive context,  three features are minimally required to speak of
quotation as an act of  mentioning, in music as in language. This is a stipulation, and as
such it has to prove its usefulness.
The first feature is replication. Quotation is a deliberate action that involves the re-
use of  certain words borrowed from another speaker, or more generally from another
context. Musical quotation is usually thought of  as a replication in those parameters
which are primarily  identified in the score:  pitches  and durations,  in  configurations
somewhat vaguely identified as motifs,  phrases and themes, although in rare cases a
harmonic succession or even a single chord may be quotable (the Tristan chord being
the obvious example). A phrase or motif  may be abstracted from peripheral factors
such as key and instrumentation, as one may abstract a linguistic expression from its
graphic or spoken appearance. There is thus nothing in principle which precludes liter-
alness, or faithful replication, in musical quotation. More peripheral aspects of  a com-
position may be imitated, but one would presumably hesitate to speak of  ‘replication’
of  instrumentation, style, etc. Imitation in these peripheral parameters may be intended
to allude to some other work or style, and this allusion may enrich the associative con-
text; but allusion must be distinguished from quotation. Obviously, though, a quotation
may be used to allude to the broader context of  its provenance.
The second is reference.16 The quotation refers to its source, as, for instance, some-
16 For Nelson Goodman (as for Davidson), quotation marks have a referential function. Goodman thinks that 
musical quotation lacks reference, because it lacks quotation marks, even though he admits that other clues 
(context, emphasis, and pause), ‘sufficiently standardized, might constitute an auditory device for direct quotation
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thing that Peter said, or more vaguely, the speech habits of  a certain community, or just
to the sign itself, as when Peter would introduce himself  by saying: ‘Peter’, mentioning
his name. Reference crucially depends on intention recognized. It makes no sense to
speak of  involuntary quotation – though it frequently occurs that unwittingly one bor-
rows an expression from elsewhere. It evidently also depends upon the listener’s ability
to identify the referent, at least in an approximate way.
In language, every word and many expressions (idioms, phraseologisms) are taken
from some language’s lexicon, and it is implied in the speaker’s communicative inten-
tion that her utterances are recognized as belonging to that language. In that sense they
refer to that language as a source. Similarly in music, the patterns that define the tonal
system form a somewhat ill-defined lexicon from which elements are freely borrowed.
The extent to which compositions in the European post-renaissance (‘tonal’) tradition
have been shaped by a repertoire of  basic tonal patterns has long been underestim-
ated.17 A notorious pitfall of  the once popular  Reminiscenzjagd is the identification of
such unspecific, ‘grammatical’ borrowings with specific works. 
To distinguish quotation from mere borrowing, even in cases where the borrowing
is specific, intentional and referential (as may be the case in the use of  a cantus firmus),
a third feature must be added, embedding.18 A quotation is a piece of  alien discourse
that is embedded in the primary discourse, and thereby may be identified as an alien
element. It is this feature that allows the transformation of  the sign into its metasign.
Mere replication – such as Alice’s re-using Peter’s words in (9b) - is not quotation. It be-
comes a quotation by being pasted into another argument or report, and recognizably
referring to the earlier context, as in (9c). Even if  that primary discourse has no exten-
sion beyond the quotation – as when Alice marks her quotation by her tone of  voice
(in 9d). Here the utterance is an imitation of  Peter’s behaviour; it is the discrepancy
between its meaning and Alice’s communicative intention that marks the words as quo-
tation.
(9a) (Peter:) Bankers are crooks.
(9b) (Alice:) I don’t think all bankers are crooks.
(9c) (Alice:) I don’t think all ‘bankers are crooks’.
(9d) (Alice, sarcastically:) ‘Bankers are crooks.’
As in language, a quotation may be recognized without being marked, or may mark it-
self, so to speak, by mere familiarity. The first eight notes from Für Elise, a snippet from
the Carmen habanera, or an iconic expression of  just two or three words (to boldly go) will
stand out immediately in almost any context. With sufficient familiarity and frequency,
such unmarked quotations may lose their status as quotation and become phraseolo-
gisms (between heaven and earth), where reference to the original context is absent or irrel-
evant.
Each of  these three features may be only weakly present, resulting in a gliding scale
from strong, paradigmatic cases to vaguely quotational phenomena. It is precisely this
circumstance that makes quotation a fascinating, multifaceted phenomenon, and it al-
in language or in music’. Goodman (1978: 50, 52).
17 Cf. Gjerdingen (2007).
18 Of  Goodman’s ‘two necessary conditions for quotation’, containment and reference, the first corresponds with 
my replication rather than embedding. Goodman (1978: 43).
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lows us to approach musical quotation from a different angle than is customary. Tradi-
tionally, the study of  musical quotation is limited to instances where a fragment from
one piece is recognizably used in another piece. In my proposal, those typical instances
are included as one end of  the spectrum.19 It is also possible however to observe how a
recurring idea, theme or phrase may be both used and mentioned within one composi-
tion. This is a more contentious issue, because repetition and recurrence are not only
frequent but constitutive elements of  music. Evidently, in this respect music strongly
differs from most forms of  linguistic discourse.20 One does not say the same thing
twice without reason, and a repeat can never be merely the same thing said again. 
The point has been made, with considerable exaggeration, by André Grétry in his
famous quip about the man “who cuts his speech in two and repeats each half ”:
A sonata is a speech (discours). What would we think of  a man who cuts his speech in
two and repeats each half ? “I called upon you this morning; yes, I called upon you this
morning,  to discuss  some business  matter;  to  discuss  some business  matter”.  That,
more or less, is the effect which useless musical reprises have upon me. It’s a different
matter when a charming phrase or short tune is repeated three or four times; for just as
a man may say ten times I love you to his sweetheart, in the same way, I should think, one
may repeat an expressive melodic phrase. I’m speaking in particular about those long
reprises which make up half  a speech. (Grétry 1797: 356-7, my transl.)
But whereas the musical formalist concludes that a sonata is  not  a speech, Grétry up-
holds the opposite, and directs his criticism against contemporary compositional prac-
tice. The discursive nature of  music is his premise. His remark is of  interest also as a
reminder that some forms of  discourse, particularly, affective (as against propositional)
speech are more tolerant of  repetition than the formalist may concede. 
To the extent that music is recognized to have a discursive or quasi-discursive char-
acter, its themes, phrases, or ‘ideas’ will  be interpreted as statements, or meaningful,
communicative acts. And the more a theme has the character of  a statement, the less
repeatable it is, or the stronger the urge to find meaning when it is repeated. Alternat-
ively, it may lose its assertoric character and fade into the background. The opening
four notes of  Beethoven’s Fifth constitute an exemplary emphatic statement. Its imme-
diate repetition one tone lower may be heard as a continuation or development of  that
statement, but it would be absurd to consider the incessant repetitions of  that rhyth-
mical motif  throughout the movement as something like rhetorical  anaphora.  What
seems to happen,  rather,  in  this  and numerous similar  cases,  is  that  the material  is
moved to a different plane, from foreground to background, becoming basic material
for a larger scale harmonic-rhythmic process. 
Music Mentioned
A few examples may help bridging the gap between linguistic and musical discourse. I
will discuss three, illustrating music quoted in speech, in vocal music, and in instrumen-
19 ‘A musical quotation is a deliberate evocation within a composition of  a different musical work.’ Bicknell (2001: 
185). ‘[Quotation], as defined here, refers to the placement of  parts of  a pre-existent piece in a new composition 
or performance. ... Quotation is also set apart by the prominence of  the borrowing, which is made to stick out 
from the surrounding music.’ Metzer (2003: 4).
20 See however Young (2014: 120-124).
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tal music.
The fact that linguistic quotation is open to other sign systems has already been
shown in relation to musical notation (5). More to the point is the integration of  actual
music in speech, as in (10), from the famous scene in the movie Casablanca where Ilsa
(Ingrid Bergman) persuades a pretendedly forgetful Sam (Dooley Wilson) to perform
As Time Goes By.
(10) (Ilsa:) I’ll hum it for you. (Hums two bars.)
Here Ilsa gives a demonstration, but not of  behaviour. In order to show ‘how it goes’,
Ilsa presents a sample of  the song, rather than giving a performance. Writing the notes
on a napkin would have served the same function. If  Sam were to criticize her hum-
ming (‘Sorry,  Miss Ilsa,  but  you’re out  of  tune’),  it  would have sounded misplaced.
Maybe (10) fails to qualify as an instance of  quotation because the humming is not part
of  the sentence. We may remedy this by changing it into It goes like ‘...’ or It begins with
‘...’, where the music fulfils the syntactic function of  a noun. 
In similar ways, music may be mentioned in a musical context. The opening solo of
Bach’s Cantata 158, for bass singer and basso continuo, is a miniature sermon upon the
liturgical salutation, Der Friede sei mit dir (Pax vobiscum) (Ex. 1). These formulaic opening
words are continued in the text as an address to the speaker’s own soul (Peace be with you,
my fearful conscience! Your Mediator has annulled the burden of  your debt ...). The salutation itself
is sung as an arioso on a walking bass, the continuation, the sermon, as free recitative.
The alternation of  arioso and recitative clearly articulates the distinction between con-
tents mentioned and contents used. The recitative constitutes a basic level of  discourse,
in which the quotations are embedded as an object for contemplation. 21 In this case the
music, unlike the text, does not refer to a specific source (such as a chant associated
with these words). Bach does use however a cadential formula in a way that emphatic-
ally exposes its formulaic nature, with its odd placement at the beginning of  the piece.
In this way he ‘marks’ the quotation with the help of  musical syntax.
Any musical device that highlights a passage as in some way standing apart from
the main discourse may under certain circumstances serve as musical quotation marks:
a disruption of  the flow by contrasting metre and rhythm, texture, dynamics, a discon-
tinuity in harmonic syntax, or harmonic stasis. The use of  contrast as a musical mark-
ing device is not an eighteenth century novelty; nor is it particularly subtle. Such con-
trasts have been used for refrains in vocal music at least since the fourteenth century ars
nova, and those refrains often involve textual and sometimes musical quotations.22 As
common in popular and folk music, refrains do not usually contain quoted material
from elsewhere, but they do present quotable content. Embedded in an ongoing dis-
course through repetition, and often highlighted by shared (‘sing-along’) performance
they acquire something like a proverbial character.
21 The arioso treatment of  quotations in sacred recitative is discussed (with an example from Carl Heinrich Graun) 
by J.A.P. Schulz in his article ‘Recitativ’, in Johann Georg Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (Leipzig: 
Weidemanns Erben und Reich, 1771), vol. 2, 942-953.
22 Cf. Suzannah Clark, ‘Refrain’, in Grove Music Online (OUP, 2001) <https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/> 
accessed 18 October 2019; Yolanda Plumley (2003: 363), referring to Guillaume de Machaut.
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Ex. 1. J.S. Bach: Cantata BWV158/1.
When a musical idea recurs in a different context, rather than being immediately repeat-
ed, it is possible that the circumstances of  its recurrence make it appear as a reference
to or reflection upon its earlier occurrence. When this happens, a third dimension is
opened up in musical discourse, beyond the simultaneous and the successive: in various
ways music may ‘turn on itself ’, to use Davidson’s expression.
An example is the last statement of  the main theme in the coda of  Mozart’s G mi-
nor Symphony K550 (Ex. 2). It enters not on the tonic, as in the original statement, but
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on the dominant, a harmonically unstable moment which resolves by a little cadential
detour. The theme is, as it were, projected onto a fractured surface: it falls apart into
several canonic echoes, subjected to a fleeting harmonic progression on top of  a punc-
tuated tonic pedal. The closing formula, with its sudden forte, inverts the rhythm of  the
theme (  |   ), almost as a contradiction, and repeats it mechanically, terminating
rather than concluding the movement. In its placement as a post facto event, this ap-
pearance of  the theme is backward looking. It is a reminder of  the theme rather than a
direct statement, and as such, the theme is mentioned rather than used.
In this example we may observe a subtle use of  what is in fact a common, almost
trivial device, that might be described as a theme-reminder on a final tonic pedal. The
pedal point here functions as an embedding device; and it is the much familiar device to
fulfil that function. Its most striking manifestation is the concerto cadenza, which has
developed from a mere ornament on a suspension before the penultimate chord into an
elaborate free fantasia. Everything that happens during this postponement of  the final
resolution is a parenthetical digression within the main discourse. Lacking their proper
harmonic-syntactic root, themes that recur in this setting tend to lose whatever their as-
sertoric character they may have; they become signs of  themselves.
Ex. 2. W.A. Mozart: Symphony in G minor K550/1.
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Metasigns, Semantics, and Grammaticalization
These observations should make it plausible, in an introductory way, that in music (as in
language) a fluid distinction applies between contents used and mentioned. It supports
the general contention that despite their being very different, and in many ways incom-
mensurable sign systems, music and language yet have significant features in common.
Some features that are essential to language may be incidental to music, and become
relevant only in a certain cultural tradition. The autoreflexivity of  quotation seems to be
an essential feature of  language, that can be adopted by music of  a certain complexity.
Just as it is often possible to ignore quotation in a verbal text (at the price of  a reduced
understanding, but not always complete misunderstanding), so it is possible to ignore
this ‘third dimension’ of  music, of  musical ideas referring to themselves, as well as to
other ideas and discourses, and to reduce it to a linear flow of  empty syntax. It’s just a
poorer way of  listening.
Given its remarkable syntactic,  lexical  and semantic features, it  is  surprising that
quotation has been so widely ignored in general linguistic theory.23 Even in the philo-
sophical  debate,  it  is  often assumed that  this  metalinguistic  feature is  paralinguistic,
something that lies outside the domain of  language itself.24 It is more likely that meta-
representation, or the ability to transform signs into more complex metasigns, plays an
essential role in the formation of  the lexicon, and as a specifically human ability may
provide an important cognitive clue as to how human language has evolved from a
more primitive form of  communication.25 
An essential difference between language and animal systems is the generalization
of  a sign beyond an immediate context of  action. A word is not a signal, but a men-
tionable sign that can be freely used in any context. It is our ability to think of  words as
words and what they mean that allows us to detach these signs from an immediate action
context. Simply put, the ability to speak of  fire without causing alarm involves the abil-
ity to reflect upon that sign (‘fire’) – to mention it – without thinking there is a fire
(fire!). The plain signal, or fire alarm, has no reference (it does not denote fire), but is
bound to conditions of  use and action (scream when there is a fire, and run with the others).
As long as it works as a signal, in the appropriate situation and associated with appro-
priate action, it is not reflected upon as a sign. But used outside this action context
(when there is no fire – as a bad joke maybe?) it will conjure the idea of  fire in its ab-
sence. The false signal is not ‘used’; it fails as a signal. However, by that very fact it is
brought to attention (‘mentioned’) as what it is, a signal. Dissociated from its context of
action, the signal may become a symbol for fires in general. It is then no longer men-
tioned, but used as a symbol with a highly generalized reference, a word that accumu-
lates meaning by association with other words.
This is a speculative hypothesis about a stage in the formation of  language.  Its
23 For a combination of  linguistic and philosophical perspectives, see Brendel, Meibauer and Steinbach (2007 and 
2011).
24 Récanati (2001: 680) for instance argues that quotation is ‘at bottom, a paralinguistic phenomenon, like gesturing 
or intonation’, because its meaning is ‘pictorial’ rather than linguistic. Similarly Philippe de Brabanter, ‘Why 
Quotation Is Not a Semantic Phenomenon, and Why It Calls for a Pragmatic Theory’, in Depraetere and Salkie 
(2017: 227–254).
25 Sperber, ‘Metarepresentations in an Evolutionary Perspective’, in id. (2000: 117-137, at 117).
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plausibility derives from the fact that it is an extrapolation from a process that we can
see in action every day. Grammaticalization is a development ‘from lexical to grammat-
ical forms, and from grammatical to even more grammatical forms’, 26 or as Wilhelm
von Humboldt put it, from Sachbedeutung to Formbedeutung.27 Words routinely lose their
referential quality and become features of  syntax, which are meaningful only through
their relations with other words. In this way, the noun cause has become assimilated in
the conjunction because (by cause of/that). An adjective may be derived from a sound imit-
ation (‘that squeaky oboe’). An individual’s proper name (‘Bach’) may become an adject-
ive referring to features of  his work or style (‘a Bach recitative’; ‘this is so  Bach!’;  ‘a
somewhat Bachish aria’).
Grammaticalization is a process in one direction, from lexical reference (outward)
towards syntactic function (inward). Quotation may act as a counterpart by pushing to-
wards stronger referentiality. The ordinary word ‘crook’ acquires a narrow denotational
focus when it us used to refer to Peter’s use of  that word in one specific utterance. The
conjunction because may be transformed into a noun, which as a metasign is understood
through its reference to its conjunction original (11).
(11) Our ‘whys’ and our ‘becauses’ are obliged to stop.28
The processes of  grammaticalization (through use) and its contrary (through mention)
may on a miniature time scale be observed in a musical composition. A musical phrase
may be exposed as a quotable statement, then fade into the background as a mere fig-
ure, and emerge again as a reminder of  itself. If  the understanding we apply to such
musical processes shares cognitive resources with linguistic understanding, the study of
music may contribute to that of  language, as well as being rewarding in itself.29
26 Heine and Kuteva (2007: 32).
27 Humboldt (1825: 296).
28 Alfred Swinbourne, ‘Picture Logic or The Grave Made Gay’ (1875), quoted after OED Online (Oxford 
University Press, 2019) <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/16742> accessed 18 October 2019.
29 On the increasing neurological evidence of  brain functions shared by music and language, see e.g. Patel (2008) 
and Kunert et al. (2015).
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